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Abstract 
The concept of sketch is generalized. Morphisms of finite (generalized) sketches are used as 
sketch-entailments. A semantics and a deductive calculus of sketch-entailments are developed. 
A General Completeness Theorem (GCT) shows that the deductive calculus is adequate for the 
semantics. In each of a number of categories of sketches, a particular set of sketch-entailments is 
singled out as a set of axioms used to specify a particular kind of structured category. The 
specification yields an adequate proof-system to derive sketch-entailments valid in structured 
categories of the given kind. Classical, Tarski-type semantics is related to the sketch-semantics 
of the paper. Specific completeness theorems are given in the sketch-based formalism, and they 
are related to representation theorems of categorical logic, and known completeness theorems 
of logic. 
1991 Math. Subj. Class.: Primary 03G30; Secondary 03C99, 03F99, 18ClO 
0. Introduction 
A completeness theorem asserts the equality of the formal deducibility relation and 
the semantic consequence relation in a particular logic. Algebraic Logic and, in 
particular, Categorical Logic replaces a completeness theorem by a representation 
theorem. Witness the examples of the Stone representation theorem for Boolean 
algebras, which is the algebraic equivalent of the (strong) completeness theorem for 
classical propositional logic; the representation theorems for cylindric [14] and 
polyadic [12] algebras that correspond similarly to the Gadel-Mal’cev completeness 
theorem for Classical First Order Logic (CFOL); or the categorical representation 
theorems, also to be mentioned below, similarly corresponding to the same complete- 
ness theorem and to other completeness theorems in logic. A common element in 
*E-mail: mt78@musica.mcgill.ca. 
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0022-4049/97/$17.00 Copyright Q 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 
PII SOO22-4049(96)00007-2 
50 M. Makkai J Joumal of Pure and Applied Algebra I15 (I 997) 49- 79 
these correspondences i the fact that the algebraic and the logical formulations are 
translation-equivalent; given either the algebraic or the logical formulation, the other 
can be deduced by a formal argument that is a routine translation, all of whose 
elements are in view already when the algebraic version of the logic is introduced. In 
particular, it (the formal argument) can be carried out in a weak metatheory, not 
going, in strength, beyond a fragment of first order arithmetic. 
Thus, categorical logic already has a framework for expressing completeness 
theorems. However, it can be legitimately argued that completeness-as-representation 
does not express the full intended meaning of completeness. The fact that truth is 
carried adequately by finite combinatorial objects, namely the formal deductions, has, 
apparently, disappeared in the statement of the representation theorem. 
The Abstract Completeness Theorem (ACT) for CFOL, saying that the validities in 
CFOL form a recursively enumerable set, is an expression of the last-stated fact in an 
abstract form. Now, the ACT is nut apparent on the form of either of the representa- 
tion theorems related to CFOL as in fact it is on that of any of the usual variants of the 
completeness theorem. The fact remains that the ACT can be derived from representa- 
tion; however, this derivation, going through the translation to completeness expressed 
in the usual syntax of CFOL, requires stepping out of the framework of categorical 
logic: apparently, categorical ogic is not suflcient in itself for expressing the ACT. 
To rectify this situation, what is needed is a syntax directly related to categorical 
logic, which provides an adequate notion of formal deduction. Such a syntax is 
described in this paper, not just for CFOL, but in a uniform way, for a whole family of 
doctrines, logics in a categorical formulation. As a result, we will obtain an analysis of 
the idea of completeness, applicable, again in a uniform manner, to several ogics such 
as intuitionistic and modal logics, and generalized quantifiers. The question of 
whether the ACT is valid in a given situation becomes a precise question, provided the 
situation has been given a syntactic formulation as described here. 
The syntax to be given is a natural codification of the idea of diagram manipulation, 
the informal idea of “syntax” for category theory. The syntax is based on a generaliz- 
ation of Ehresmann’s concept of sketch [7, 11,20,10,35]. 
Three things are done with the concept of sketch in this paper. One is a simple 
but sweeping eneralization of the concept, the effect of which is that sketches become 
instrumental in essentially any (categorical) doctrine, not just ones based on limits and 
colimits as with the original, standard, notion of sketch. The second is the use 
of sketches in the specification of doctrines via sketch-axioms, which are morphisms of 
sketches. Finally, the third is the formulation of a proof-theory, specifically a notion 
of formal deduction. The new deductions deduce sketch-entailments, morphisms of 
sketches; the sketch-axioms are particular sketch-entailments. The new notion 
of deducibility serves to formulate a General Completeness Theorem (GCT), valid in 
any sketch-specified octrine. 
The “real”, or Specijic Completeness Theorems (SCTs) result from the combination 
of Representation Theorems (RTs) and the appropriate GCT. Each RT depends not 
just on the doctrine at hand, but also on the choice of the representing objects in the 
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doctrine. For instance, in the doctrine of Intuitionistic First Order Logic, we have the 
RT in which the representing objects are the presheaf categories (this is related to 
Kripke’s completeness theorem [ 191) and another one in which the representing 
objects are the categories of sheaves over complete Heyting algebras (compare 
[32,33]). One form of the RT related to the standard completeness theorem for 
CFOL refers to the doctrine of coherent categories, and Set, the category of sets, as the 
(single) representing object in it. Accordingly, a SCT refers to a doctrine as well as 
choice of semantical objects (as the “representing objects” can alternatively be called) 
in it; the GCT refers to a doctrine alone. Note that the role of representation theorems, 
the hallmark of Algebraic Logic, remains integral in the theory. 
An Abstract Completeness Theorem (ACT) will express the property of a class of 
objects (sometimes a single object) within a doctrine, namely the fact that the 
exactness properties of the class for the operations codified in the doctrine form 
a recursively enumerable set. The ACT of this paper formulated for the categorical 
doctrine of first order logic, and the distinguished object the category of sets, is 
translation-equivalent to the usual ACT for CFOL. 
There is an adequate expression of Compactness in this context as well. 
Next, I give a more detailed account of the basic ideas of the paper, and their 
connections with the literature. The remarks that follow will perhaps be more easily 
understood after having seen the basic concepts in the first three sections. 
According to Ehresmann, a sketch is a graph with certain cones and cocones 
distinguished in it. A simple-minded generalization is to allow arbitrary types of 
distinguished diagrams in place of cones and cocones. The intention is, as with 
Ehresmann, to associate certain definite qualities with the distinguished iagrams; in 
Ehresmann’s case these are “limit cone” and “colimit cocone”. In the case of Ehres- 
mann’s sketches, this intention is realized by the fixing of the intended semantics, 
which stipulates that a model of a sketch, a graph map from the underlying category of 
the sketch into a category, should turn the distinguished cones and cocones into limit 
cones and colimit cocones, respectively. 
The Ehresmannian semantics has an obvious and potentially vast extension to the 
generalized sketches, by associating essentially arbitrary qualities of diagrams in 
categories with the distinguished iagrams, the only restriction being that the quality 
associated with a diagram has to match the shape of the diagram. For example, in 
Cartesian closed categories, the operation of exponentiation involves a kind of 
diagram that contains all the data for any particular exponential, in much the same 
way as a limit cone contains the necessary data for a particular instance of limit; since 
a product is involved in the exponential, the data for that product are part of the 
diagram. Thus, we have a corresponding kind of (generalized) sketch for Cartesian 
closed categories. In this kind of semantic determination, it is not necessary to limit 
ourselves to qualities given by universal properties; the target categories may need to 
have additional structure to support the semantics. 
This paper adopts the above-described simple-minded extension of the notion of 
sketch. However, it restricts the possible semantics to a certain “internal” form, in 
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contrast to the “purely external”, and in principle arbitrary, determination in Ehres- 
mann’s style of the qualities talked about above. 
Lair’s trames (webs) [21] are generalized sketches, for the purposes of dealing with 
categorical operations defined by universal properties. These “adjoint operations”, 
Lawvere’s most important contribution to the foundational applications of category 
theory, are defined in a hierarchical fashion, one operation serving as a basis for 
another’s adjoint definition. An example is the above-mentioned exponentiation, which 
uses binary product in its definition. Lair’s trames are explicitly built in a hierarchical 
fashion conforming to the character of the operations they intend to specify. They 
represent asubstantial generalization of the notion of sketch, sufficient for the specifica- 
tion of all adjoint operations. In relation to the (generalized) sketches of this paper, they 
are “special purpose” sketches. They have a specific form, among others with a negative 
part and a positive part distinguished, corresponding to “left-adjoint” and “right-adjoint” 
type operations. The present paper’s generalized sketches are more general and more 
simple-minded; once again, in this paper the weight of the responsibility for specificity 
is placed on sketch-semantics in a new sense, rather than on the notion of sketch. 
In the examples, this paper also adopts the hierarchical aspect of sketch-building, 
inasmuch sketches for Cartesian closed categories in this paper are based on sketches 
for Cartesian categories. However, in the general concept there is no need to carry 
along the hierarchical character. 
The semantics of trames is of the same “external” kind as that of Ehresmann’s 
sketches. 
Another notion of generalized sketch is Wells’firms [34]. A form is derived from 
a pre-supposed specification of any particular doctrine (kind of structured category); 
this specification is assumed to be in the form of a finite limit sketch. Thus, if one has 
a finite limit sketch whose models are Cartesian closed categories (which does exist for 
the notion of Cartesian closed category with specified operations and morphisms 
preserving the operations on the nose), then Wells’ theory gives a notion of “Cartesian 
closed form”; any one Cartesian closed form specifies (is the presentation of) a particu- 
lar Cartesian closed category. 
The chief difference between the sketches of this paper and the forms of Wells is that 
the former arise directly from the common definition of the doctrine considered, 
whereas the second needs the mediation of the finite-limit specification of the doctrine. 
Wells’ forms use the language of finite-limit sketches as a specification language; this 
paper’s sketches use a direct, and simple, specification language. Another difference is 
that the Wells forms apply only to doctrines that are finite-limit specifiable. The 
doctrine of Cartesian closed categories, with morphisms preserving the operations 
only up to isomorphism, is not finite-limit specifiable. The present paper’s approach is 
not affected by this fact, and it applies equally well to the two versions of the doctrine 
of Cartesian closed categories. 
As already indicated, the main idea of the paper is a sketch-semantics in a new sense. 
This is given by the well-known notion of relative injectivity (an object injective 
relative to an arrow, or a set of arrows; see Cl]) in an arbitrary category. The category 
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in this case is the category of all sketches of a certain particular kind. Thus, we are 
talking about a sketch S satisfying an arrow Y of sketches, the latter pictured as an 
entailment, in the sense of “the domain situation entailing the codomain situation”. 
The definition is that S \ r iff all arrows from the domain of r to S factor through r; that 
is, iff S is injective relative to r. 
The novelty is certainly not in the general form of the semantics, which is injectivity. 
A strong form of injectivity, orthogonality (“factors through a unique arrow” above) 
appears already in [9] as a tool of semantics; e.g., the sheaves with respect o a given 
topology are selected by orthogonality conditions from among the presheaves. For 
a history of orthogonality and injectivity, see the historical remarks to Chs. 1 and 4 in 
[l]. As another example, Andreka and Nemeti [2] use cone-injectivity (a generalized 
form of injectivity) as a formal tool for semantics, in their case explicitly for the 
purposes of first order logic. However, Andreka’s and Nemeti’s application of injectiv- 
ity and the ones in this paper take place in entirely different categories. In the 
Andrika-Nemeti case, the application takes place in a category containing the category 
of models of a first order theory as a subcategory. In this paper, it takes place in the 
category of sketches. Note that sketches correspond to theories in the conceptual 
framework of logic. Thus, we have a semantics, where theories themselves are being 
models of statements that are morphisms of sketches, that is , morphisms of theories. 
Sketch-axioms ( ketch-entailments used as axioms) are used to specify a doctrine in the 
form of a full subcategory of sketches atisfying the sketch-axioms. Thus the structured 
categories that are members of the doctrine appear as sketches and they are selected by 
the axioms. Semantics in Ehresmann’s ense, the concept of a model of a sketch, is 
recaptured simply in the form of a morphism of the sketch into a member of the doctrine. 
I am not aware of the existence in the literature of an anticipation of the idea of 
using the category of sketches in the manner just described. 
As was said above, sketch-semantics represents an internalization, and a conse- 
quent restriction, of a potentially arbitrary type of external sketch-semantics. It is 
rather clear that arbitrary external sketch-semantics a  was indicated above will not 
be capable of being formulated in the sketch-semantics of this paper. The bulk of the 
paper consists in the demonstration, in individual examples and classes of examples, 
that, on the other hand, sketch-semantics i  adequate for apparently all of the usual 
categorical doctrines, including ones that involve operations not defined by universal 
properties, such as monoidal categories. The fact that the sketch-semantic specifica- 
tions are available for the doctrines in question is not entirely immediate. For 
example, the necessary presence of the rule (sketch-entailment) of the form IsoTrans 
for the specification of adjoint operations (see Section 4) was a surprise to me, and the 
treatment of monoidal categories (with not necessarily strict monoidal functors as 
morphisms!) and similar doctrines requires a new, mathematically interesting way of 
looking at these doctrines. 
As was described in the first part of this introduction, the main contribution of the 
paper is a syntactic calculus, providing an adequate (sound and complete) formaliza- 
tion of sketch-semantics. 
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Although I had the basic ideas of the syntax of sketches for some years, the impetus 
to work them out was provided by Charles Wells’s talk at the October 1992 Montreal 
Category Meeting about a sketch-theoretic approach to logic aiming at proof theory. 
An extended abstract [4] of the projected work “Graph-based logic and logic” by him 
and Bagchi was made available on the Category Theory Network. It seems to me that 
the approach of the present paper is substantially different from that of Bagchi and 
Wells, which is based on Wells’ forms mentioned above. 
The proof of the General Completeness Theorem, expressing the adequacy of the 
deductive calculus, combines the classical construction of enough injectives in a 
general setting, with a finiteness argument hat exploits the specifics of construction. 
The construction itself is, needless to say, far from being new. For example, it appears 
in Barr [4a], where the author refers to Grothendieck’s construction of enough 
injectives in AB.5 categories as the source for his own proof. 
The technical aspects of this paper are rather minor. On the other hand, I am struck 
by the conceptual importance of the scheme, which shows, to me at least, that 
categorical logic is, to a great degree, autonomous, even in matters syntactical. 
I believe that in the literature there is no general theory of completeness in logic (not 
just categorical logic) comparable to the present one in scope and conceptual unity. 
The paper [25] is a summary of related material. The present paper is a working out 
of certain of the details of Sections 1,2,3 and 5 [25]. Ref. [25] contains ideas for work 
in proof theory proper in the context of the sketch-based syntax. Another paper [26] 
is in preparation, which, within the framework of the present one, gives an algebraic 
theory of doctrines, concentrating on their bicategorical aspects. 
When item m in Section n is referred to in another section, I use the notation am. 
1. Categories of sketches 
Let G be a category, and K = (K)KE,K, a (small) indexed set of objects K of G. We 
define a new category GJ K, the category of sketches over G with specijication names the 
elements of 1 K I, and specijicution types the objects If of G for K E 1 KI. The objects of 
G/K are entities of the form S = (jSj,(KIS])KE,ICl) with ISJ ~0b(G), and 
K [S] c horn (K, ISI) (K E 1 KI). In other words, a sketch S is given by an underlying 
G-object 1 SI, and, for each specification ame K E JKI, by a set K[S] of K-specifica- 
Cons, each K-specification being a morphism K + ( S ) in G. An arrow cp :S + T in G I K 
isanarrow(cp(:IS(~JTIsuchthat,forallKEIKJ,sEK[S]wehave)cp(osEK[T]; 
in other words, a map of sketches is a morphism on the underlying level that 
transforms pecifications into specifications. Composition of arrows in G) K is as in G. 
In our examples, we will always have that the map K I-+ K is an identity; each 
specification type will be its own name. In this case, K is given by the set ) KI of objects 
of G, and we write K for this set ) KI; now, the construction gives a category G( K on the 
basis of a category G and a set K of objects of G. The reason for the general definition 
as it is given is to allow for the theoretical possibility of using the same specification 
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type with more than one name. For example, if G is the category of sets, and we want 
to use the empty set as a specification type with two different names, we have to use 
the first-stated efinition with K H K not 1-1. However, with the same G, if we avoid 
the empty set as a specification type, we can always find enough distinct isomorphic 
copies of prospective specification types to be able to use them as their own names. We 
will take advantage of the latter possibility in our examples, for underlying categories 
G different from, but related to, the category of sets. 
The reader familiar with Ehresmann’s ketches [7] will immediately see how they 
arise as an example of the general construction; in particular, G in that case is the 
category of graphs. To aid the reader’s intuition, I now give an even simpler example, 
“sketches to specify categories”. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 are devoted to the systematic 
presentation of many other examples. 
Gruphs are directed graphs. A (small) graph is the same as an object of the category 
Set” (Set is the category of small sets and functions), with g the graph A$O; for 
G E SeP, Oh(G) = G(0) = the set of objects of G, Arr(G) = G(A) = the set of arrows 
of G; for u E Arr(G), d(u) and c(u) are the domain and codomain of u, respectively. 
We single out the following two specific graphs I and CT as specification types: 
I: 
CT: 
(“identity”) 
(“commutative triangle”) 
I has one object 0, and one arrow (0,O) : 0 -+ 0. CT has three objects and three arrows 
as shown. Let us stress that I and CT are given individually, and not just up to 
isomorphism. They will serve as names for copies of themselves in other graphs, and 
have to be fixed absolutely. 
The general definition of GIX is applied with G = Graph = SeP, the category of 
(small) graphs, and K = {I, CT). The resulting category, cSk, is called the category of 
category-sketches, or c-sketches for short for their role (to be described in the next 
section) in specifying categories. Spelled out, the definition is as follows. A category- 
sketch (c-sketch) S is a graph 1 S 1, together with a set I [S] of graph-maps I + 1 S ( (the 
identity spec$cations in S) and a set CT [S] of graph-maps CT + 1 S ( (the commutative 
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triangle specifications in S). A map q : S -+ T of c-sketches is a graph-map 1 cp I: 1 S I--+ I T 1 
with the property that for any I E I[S], cpoz E I[T] and for any z E CT[S], 
cpoz E CT[T]; a map of sketches takes an identity-specification or a commutative 
triangle specification in the domain into an entity of the same kind in the codomain. 
We also consider a variant of the construction GI K. Given G and K = (K)KE,sr, as 
before, we define G (1 K to be the following category. An object S of G 11 K is given by an 
object IS I of G, and for each K E I K(, an abstract set K [S] and a K[S]-indexed family 
(S) s E KCsl of morphisms S: K -+ I S I. A morphism cp :S + T of G II K is given by a mor- 
phismIcpI:ISI-t(TIandfunctionsK[~]:K[S]-,K[T](KEIKI)suchthatforall 
K E IKJ and for all s E K[S], we have (K[q](s))-= /~/OS’, diagramatically, 
K[Sl 
( I- 
* G@ISI) 
Klcpl 
I 
0 
I 
kPlc( 1 
KVI ( I- * Wf,ITI) 
(a circle in a diagram signifies commutativity). Composition of morphisms in G /I K is 
defined componentwise. Let us add that the identity morphisms have all their 
components identities. 
Once again, in our examples, the naming-function K ++ K will be the identity; we 
have the category G 11 K for a set K of objects of G. 
GlK is, essentially, the part of G II K in which each indexing s -+ S above is 1-1. 
Indeed, the obvious inclusion GI K + G // K is full and faithful, and its essential image 
consists of the objects of G /I K with the said property of injectivity. 
The second, more complicated, construction G 1) K is more basic than the first one, 
GI K. For one thing, the construction G //K is enough; the uses of the GI K can be 
replaced by uses of the Cl1 K, but not (apparently) vice versa. For another, the 
categories obtained by the construction G I/ K are better behaved than the ones 
obtained by the other construction. (These remarks will be expanded on below). 
Nevertheless, the simpler construction GI K will be the one used more frequently. 
The two constructions will be employed to produce a large class of sketch-catego- 
ries, which in turn will be used for the specification of kinds of structured categories. 
The constructions will be used iteratively; we start with a simple category G (most 
commonly, Graph), obtain GJK(less frequently, G 1) K) for a suitable K c Oh(G), then 
use GI K (or G II K) as the category G’ to construct a further sketch-category G’I K’ (or 
G’ /I K’), and possibly iterate the procedure. 
As we will see, the structure, especially the colimit structure, of the sketch-categories 
will be important. In fact, all our sketch-categories will be very simple, familiar kinds 
of categories, with well-understood colimit structure, among other things. Specifically, 
if we only use the construction G 1) K, and we start (as we do in the examples) with 
simple enough “base-“categories, as sketch-categories we get, up to isomorphism, 
functor categories of the form Set7 If certain finiteness requirements in the data are 
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met (as they are in almost all examples), here the category X is finite. When we also use 
the construction G(K, we obtain reflective subcategories with special properties of 
categories of the form Setx. In what follows, we elaborate on these remarks. 
A presheaf topos is a category of the form Set”, with X any small category; a finite 
topos (the terminology is that of [3]) is any SetX where X is a finite category (having 
finitely many objects and arrows). Every presheaf topos is a locally finitely presentable 
(lfp) category (for concepts in the Gabriel-Ulmer theory of lfp categories, see [IS, 11). 
Note, to begin with, that the category Graph = Setg is a finite topos; the graph 
g here can be replaced by the category it freely generates, which has only identity 
arrows in addition to those of g. Similarly, the category of 2-graphs is a finite topos: 
2-Graph = Set”z, where cz is the category 
2% 1 $0; dd’ = dc’, cd’ = cc’ 
(only the non-identity arrows are shown). 2-Graph gives rise to a sketch-category that 
can be used to specify the concept of 2-category (in the sense of sketch-semantics, see 
Section 2). We can make similar remarks on n-graphs and n-categories in general. 
In a finite topos Setx, the finitely presentable (fp) objects are exactly the$nite ones, 
that is, the functors G:X --* Set for which G(X) is finite for all X E X. The reason is as 
follows. Regardless of whether X is finite, if G:X-+ Set, and ((Xi, Xi E GX,)), E I is 
a family of “elements” of G, then the subfunctor F of G generated by these elements 
has F(Y) = ((Gf)(Xi): i E I, (f:Xi + Y) E Arr(X)} for all Y E Oh(X); if X and I are 
finite, F is finite (independently of G). It is clear that every fp functor is finitely generated 
(that is, it is as F above with I finite); in fact, this would hold in a much greater 
generality. Thus, in a finite topos, every fp object is finite; the converse is fairly clear. 
More generally, for any lfp category A, if X is a finite category, we have 
(AX),, = (4JX. 
I claim that 
(1) If G is a presheaf topos, then G I( K is isomorphic to a presheaf topos; ifG is afinite 
topos, 1K1 is a finite set, and each K (K E (Kj) is a jinite object in G, then G II K is 
isomorphic to a finite topos. 
Proof. Let G = Setx, K = (R), t lKl an indexed set of objects of G. We construct the 
following category X*K. We let 
Ob(X*K)d; Oh(X) L- 1 KI 
(for simplicity, we assume that Oh(X) and [Kl are disjoint sets, Ob(X*K) = 
Ob(X)u IKl). The arrows of X*K are as follows. The arrows X + Y in X*K for 
X, Y E Oh(X) c Ob(X*K) are those in X. For K E IKJ and X E Oh(X), the arrows 
K -+ X in X*K are the triples (K, X, a), with a E KX. The only arrows with domain 
and codomain both in I KI c Ob(X*K) are identities. There are no arrows of the form 
X -+ K for K E IK(, X E Oh(X). 
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Composition in X*K is given as follows. The arrows between objects in 
Oh(X) c Ob(X*K) are composed as in X. For composition of the form K -+ X + Y 
(X, Y E Oh(X), K E llul), we have 
(f: X + Y)O K X9 Qjdef (K Y,QfM>. (2) 
All other compositions involve identities, and thus are obvious. The associativity of 
the composition in X*K is a consequence of the same fact for X, and the functoriality 
of the K:X+ Set, K E (KI. 
IfX, llyl and the functors K (K E IKl) are all finite, thenX*Kis a finite category. With 
Set”, the category G /I K is isomorphic (not just equivalent) to Set? The isomorphism 
( )^: G l/K& SetX*K (3) 
sends S E Ob(G 11 K) to g:X*K+ Set where J?(X) = I S/(X) (X E Oh(X)), i(K) = 
K[S] (K E IKl); forf: X + Y, s^(f) = IS/(f); and S((K,X,a)):S(K) -S(X), that is 
S((K, X, a)): K[S] + ) S I(X), is the mapping s H $x(a). The fact that s^ is a functor, in 
particular that it preserves the instance (2) of composition, is a consequence of the 
naturality of S: R --f I S 1. 
Informally, but clearly, the information contained in s^ is precisely that contained in 
S; the functor I S I is the restriction of s^ to the full subcategory on the objects in X, and 
the map .?x:R(X) -+ ) S/(X) is the same as a H S((K,X,u))(s). 
The functor (3) sends cp : S -+ T to $ : s^ -+ f for which 4x = cpx and & = K[q]; the 
naturality of 4 with respect o the arrowf: X -+ Y is the naturality of cp with respect o 
the samef, and the naturality of 4 with respect o the arrow (K,X,a):K + X is the 
condition ( I cp I, @[VI )K E IKI ) has to satisfy to give rise to the arrow 9 : S + T. The rest of 
the verification that (3) is an isomorphism of categories is left to the reader. 0 
As I said above, the construction G 11 K would suffice, at the expense of a slight 
added complexity of the specifications. According to the last-proved proposition, all 
the sketch-categories obtained by repeated use of the G /I K construction, based on 
starting categories that are finite toposes, and using finite K’s, are finite toposes. In any 
topos, coproducts are disjoint sums; colimits in general can be calculated in special 
ways; in presheaf toposes, colimits (and limits) are computed pointwise in Set. 
The following easy propositions refer to more general situations. G and K are as in 
the first sentence of the section, otherwise arbitrary. 
(4) The collection offinctors { I I: G )/ K + G} u {K [ ] : G I/ K -+ Set: K E llyl } create 
limits and colimits in G I/K. 
(5) The inclusion i E GlK -+ G 1) K has a lef udjoint 6 fur which (6(S) 1 = I SI and 
K[S(S)] = {S:s E K[S]}; GlK is a reflective subcategory ofG 11 K. 
(6) i is powerfuZz it induces bijections Subc,,K(S) + Sub,&iS) on the subobject lutti- 
ces. 6 preserves monomorphisms. The unit components ns: S + 6(S) are regular epimor- 
phisms (in G /( K; GI K is regular-epi rejective in G I/ K). 
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(7) Assume that G is an lfp category, and for every K E I KI, R is an fp object of G (in 
this case, we call the system K = (l?)K,I,IJinitary). Then G (/ K is an Ifp category, and 
an object S of G /( K is fp ifs\ S 1 is fp in G, each specification-set K [S] (K E I K() is finite, 
and for all but,finitely many K E I KI, K [S] is empty. (When in addition I K( is finite, in 
which case we call the system Kjinite, the last clause is superfluous.) 
Proof of (7). By (4), if the category G has (small) colimits, then so does G 11 K, and the 
forgetful functor 1 ) : G 11 K + G and the functors K [ ] : G (1 K + Set preserve them. 
We will show that G 11 K is &-accessible (see [ 1,281); since by the above, G /( K is 
cocomplete, it will follow that G I/ K is lfp. 
Let us call S E G I/ Kfinite if I S) is fp, each K [S] (K E 19 I) is a finite set, and all but 
finitely many K [S] (K E (3 I) are empty. Using what filtered colimits are in G/I K, it is 
easy to check that every finite object is fp. Next, I claim that every object of G I( K is 
a filtered colimit of finite objects. In fact, writing A for Gl( K, and Ar for the full 
subcategory of A consisting of the finite objects, we can show that the canonical diagram 
(~~:A+S)I+A:A,LS+A (8) 
is filtered, and has S as a colimit, with coprojections eq = cp. 
TO see that Ar JS is a filtered category, let & = (ai: Ai + S, LX,: Ai + Aj),:i+j be 
a finite diagram in Ar IS. Since IS I is a canonical filtered colimit of fp objects in G, there 
isf’: U -+ 1 S I in G, with U E G fp, such that for all i, we have a commutative diagram 
and such that (bi)i provides a cocone on the diagram ld(, d composed with the 
forgetful functor G 11 K + G. For each i, K E I K( and s E K [Ai], and for Sid5 K[c+](s), 
we have $ : K + I S I. Since there are altogether finitely many Si’s (Ui,, K [Ai] is a finite 
set), and each K is fp, there is a factorization f = hg with g : U + V, fp, such that each Si 
factors as .fi = g~~i for a suitable s’i: R -+ I’. Further, we may choose g: U + I/ (by 
composing the given g with a suitable I/ + V’) so that, in addition, for every I : i 4 j, 
and every K E IKI, s E G[Ai], we have (K[cq](s))J= Si. 
_ - 
DefineBEGIIKbyIBI=T/,K[B]={si:iEZ,sEK[Ai]},and(si):K-rIB(as.~i. 
Define $: B -+ S by 1 I) I = h, each K [B] + K [S] as an inclusion. Define pi: Ai + B by 
l/Y;1 = gbi, each K[Ai] + K[B] as s H Si. Then we have 
and (Bi)i gives a cocone on d in Af IS as desired. 
Having given a flavor of the arguments involved, I leave the verification that S is 
canonically the colimit of (8) to the reader. 0 
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What we know now contains the information that G I( K is lfp; also that every fp 
object is a retract of a finite one; since the retract of an fp object of G is fp, it is 
immediate that a retract of a finite object of G )/ K is finite. 
(9) Under the same hypotheses as in (7), the inclusion i: GI K -+ G 11 Kpreservesfiltered 
colimits; thus, by (5), GI K is lfp as well. Moreover, thefp objects of GI K coincide with the 
fp objects of G 11 K that are in GIK. 
Proof of (9). By (5), or seen directly, G) K has colimits; for S = colimi E I Si we have 
IS(=colimi,,lSi) as before,andK[S] =(‘piog: iEZ,(g:X~ISil)EKISi]}, where 
the Cpi: I Si I--) I S I are colimit coprojections. It is not hard to check that the inclusion 
i: GI K -+ G (I K preserves filtered colimits; note however that this needs the hypothesis 
that K is finitary. As a reflective subcategory of an lfp category, with the inclusion 
preserving filtered colimits, Gl K is lfp. Moreover, the fp objects of G 1 K are retracts of 
the ones of the form 6(A) (6 from (5)), A fp in G I( K. However, any subobject of a finite 
object of G/I K is finite; the desired conclusion concerning the fp objects of GlK 
follows. 0 
Let us call a category G Noetherian if it is lfp, the product of two fp objects is fp, and 
every subobject of an fp object is fp. It is clear that finite toposes are Noetherian. The 
characterization of fp objects in (7) shows that if G is Noetherian, and K is finitary, 
then G//K and Gl K are Noetherian as well. 
Another property being inherited from G to G II K and GI K is being a regular 
category; if G 11 K is regular, so are GI K and the functor i; this easily follows from (4), (5) 
and (6). 
One notices that in a regular Noetherian category, any quotient of an fp object is fp, 
and that every object is the (canonical) filtered colimit of its fp subojects. 
Finally, we observe that if we have 
.p 
G G', i 
with i full, powerful and faithful and p _I i, then, for any system K = (K)K E ,x, of objects 
of G, and for iKrtz (iR)K E lK,, we have functors 
such that p’i i’, and i’ is full, powerful and faithful. In fact, when i is an inclusion, then 
so is i’; and Ip’(S)l = p(lSl), K[p’(S)] = K[S], and SCp”):G + /p’(S)1 is QO~~), for 
S@‘:K + JSI and qls, the unit of the adjunction pi i. Also, if p preserves monomor- 
phisms, so does p’, and if pi i is a regular-epi reflection, so is p’i i’. 
By afinite (resp.,Jinitary) sketch-category, we mean a category obtained by starting 
with a finite topos (resp., presheaf topos), and applying the constructions G (( K, G(K 
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iteratively in a finite number of times, always with a finite (resp., finitary) system K. We 
conclude 
(10) Every jinitary sketch-category S is regular and Noetherian, and it is a fir11 
regular-epi-rejective subcategory of a presheaf topos E such that the inclusion is 
powerful and preservesjltered colimits, the rejector preserves monomorphisms, and the 
jinite objects of S are the finite objects of E that lie in S. If S is a finite sketch-category, 
E can be chosen, in addition, to be a,finite topos. 
Finally in this section, I will describe a further analysis of the construction of 
sketch-categories that was kindly communicated to me by F.W. Lawvere. 
First of all, Lawvere points out that the foregoing constructions form a special case 
of a more general situation. Given any adjoint pair 
C+D, FiG 
of functors, we have that the comma-categories F ./IdD, IdC/G are isomorphic; in fact 
an adjunction between F and G is the same thing as an isomorphism of these 
categories making the diagram 
containing the forgetful functors commute. The category FJId,, equivalently Id,-G, 
is called the adjunction category for the given adjunction. Lawvere observes that 
(11) The categories G I/ K are precisely the adjunction categories for adjunctions 
with a discrete exponent (KI on the left side. 
(Here, we are assuming the G has colimits; the functors SetlXl + G having a right 
adjoint are precisely the left Kan extensions of functors lKlop + G.) In fact, with 
a given K = (K),.,,, as before, the functor F is the left Kan extension (or, unique 
colimit preserving extension) of the functor K H K from the discrete category 
IK(op = IKI to G along the Yoneda functor JKI + SetlK’. Indeed, an object S of the 
adjunction category is a triple (@, IS 1, Y: F@ + 1 S 1); here, we may write K H K [S] 
(K E (K I) for @; then Cp can be written in the form u, E ,,n K [S] .I KI (K, -); accordingly, 
F@ is u KElglKIS].E; and an arrow FQi-, ISI is a family (s H 5:K[S] + 
hom(KISI))K.IKI, which is precisely the data for a sketch S E G I/K. One sees that the 
notions of morphism also correspond to each other. 
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Next, Lawvere points out that 
(12) The adjunction category for an adjunction between presheaf toposes is isomor- 
phic to a presheaf topos. 
Here is the construction for (12). Consider an adjunction 
SetA c Set? F-l G 
between presheaf toposes. The adjunction category is SetB for B = A*FX constructed 
as follows. Oh(B) = Ob(A)uOb(X). Both A and X are full subcategories of B. The 
arrows A + X, with A E A, X E X, are the elements of (FA”) (X), with A” = A (A, -). 
There are no arrows of the form X -+ A, with A E A, X E X. The composites of 
BLAAX, AAXAY with B, AEA, X,YEX and tE(FA)(X) are 
tf = (@)x(t), ur = ((W(4)(t). 
To explain the isomorphism between the adjunction category and SetB, start with 
an object (C, D, FCLD) of the adjunction category; C E SetA, D E Set? The Yoneda 
correspondence assigns a”: A” + C to any a E C(A); we have Pa”: Fa -+ FC, and com- 
posing with h, ho Fa”: FA” + D and the function 
(ho F&(FA”)(X) -+ D(X). 
The restrictions to A and X of the functor @ corresponding to (C, D, FCAD) are 
C and D, respectively, and for t: A + X, that is, t E (Fa)(X), the value @t: @A + @X, 
i.e., @t:C(A) + D(X), is the map 
(a E C(A)) H (ho F&(t). 
Of course, these determinations generalize the ones going into the proof of (1). 
Further, Lawvere points out a special property of the categories A*FX thus 
constructed. A category is called one-way (see [22]) if its endomorphism monoids are 
trivial (the only element of hom(X, X) is lx). The skeletal one-way categories are those 
without circuits: without positive-length composable paths of non-identity arrows 
starting and ending in the same object. If X is a finite skeletal one-way category, then 
for any X E X, we can set d(X), the level of X, the maximal integer n such that there is 
a length-n composable path starting in X of non-identity arrows. It is clear that all 
arrows go from an object to a lower level object. Conversely, if the set of objects of 
a category is partitioned into levels so that all arrows go from an object to a lower 
level object, then the category is clearly skeletal and one-way. Let the height of the 
category be the maximal level of any object in it. 
In Lawvere’s construction, if the categories A and X are one-way, then so is A *rX; the 
property “skeletal” is similarly inherited. In fact, if F is finite meaning that each (FA”)( X) 
(A EA, X E X) is a finite set, and ifA andXare both finite, skeletal and one-way, then so 
is A*FX, and the height of A*FXis less than or equal to the sum of heights of A and X. 
As was pointed out in (1 l), the construction of the sketch-category SetX /I K corre- 
sponds to the construction A*FX with A = 1 K( a discrete category. Thus, every finite 
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sketch-category built up by using only the construction G I/K is of the form SetX for 
a finite, skeletal one-way category X. Conversely, every such SetX is a finite sketch- 
category via the I/ construction starting with the terminal category 1; this is shown by 
an obvious induction on the height of X. In conclusion: the finite sketch-categories via 
the 11 construction are precisely the finite toposes with a finite, skeletal, one-way 
exponent. 
Note finally that Graph, 2-Graph and, indeed, n-Graph in general are one-way 
toposes, finite toposes with one-way exponent categories. 
2. Sketch semantics 
Let S be an arbitrary category; we talk about “sketches” when referring to objects of 
S since in the applications S will be a sketch-category obtained by the constructions 
described in Section 1. Let r: R -+ R’ be an arbitrary arrow in 5’. We say that a sketch 
S E S satisfies Y, in symbols Sk r, if 
(*) any cp : R -+ S factors through r; that is, for any cp : R + S, there is cp’: R’ + S such 
that 
I 
commutes. 
Because of their use in this definition, the maps of S are sometimes called sketch- 
axioms, or sketch-entailments. 
To show the use of the definition, let us return to the example of S = cSk in Sect- 
ion 1; objects of cSk are called c-sketches. We define seven specific maps in cSk, the 
s(ketch)-axioms for category. Here and later, the specifications will occasionally be 
sketchy (pun unintended), but I hope that there is no serious possibility of misunder- 
standing. The maps are always” almost inclusions”; entities in the domain are mapped 
to the same-named entities in the codomain, unless there is a collapse of two entities 
into one. 
w9 
ExId: / o I--- v 
(“Existence of identity”. Here, we have two c-sketches, and a map between them. The 
domain sketch has no arrows, and has both specification-sets I [ 1, CT [ ] empty. The 
codomain sketch has I[ ] = {id,}.) 
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UnId : t 
<W) 
c) 
0 
I[ l={id,l 
(“Uniqueness of identity”; actually, superfluous.) 
ExComp : 
@J/y, o(W/1~2 
* 
(02) 
CT[ ]={idCT) 
(“Existence of composite”; in the domain, I [ ] and CT[ ] are empty; in the codomain 
I[ ] = @, and CT[ ] = {idCT}.) 
UnComp : o Y:‘r,-oy1\2 
* . 
i h 
CT[ l=([(O,l)~ f,(G?)tig,(O,2)t-W, 
[(O,l)t+ f,(1,2)Hg,(O,2)++ill 
(“Uniqueness of composite”. The domain has two commutative triangles, the codo- 
main one; the map is the obvious one, in particular, it identifies the parallel arrows. 
The lettersf, g, h, i stand for completely fixed entities such as the ones used before (e.g., 
(0, l)), and they are employed only as a shorthand). 
<wv 
0 
o-1 
(OJ) 
I[ I= Ii,) 
CT[ ]=0 
I[ I= Ii,) 
CT1 I= I71 
(‘Left identity law”. In both the domain and the codomain, there is an identity 
specification E I[ 1; in the codomain C, we have CT[C] = {z} with the map 
z:CT+ICl which maps 0,l ~0,21-+1,(0,1) ++(0,0),(1,2) ~(0,1),(0,2) I+ 
(0,l). Here, and below, a notation like i, means an inclusion-map of the entity in the 
subscript.) 
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Rid: 
(“Right identity law”; similar to Lid.) 
Assoc : 2 
3 
CT[ ]= {012,023,123} CT[ ]= {012,023, 123,013) 
(“Associative law”. The abbreviations used are self-explanatory.) 
Any category C gives rise to a c-sketch, denoted by Ccs,, whose underlying graph is 
the underlying graph of C, and for which I [Ccs,], CT [C,,,] are the set of all identities 
and the set of all commutative triangles in the category, in the usual sense, construed 
as graph-arrows I + 1 Cl, CT + 1 C( in the obvious ways. Also, with a functor F: C + D, 
we have the corresponding sketch-map F(s) : C,,, -+ DC,,; as a mapping, F(s) is identical 
to F. If a c-sketch S is obtained from a(n obviously unique) category, we say S is 
a category. Let PXcat denote the set of the seven sketch-axioms ExId,UnId, Ex- 
Comp, Uncomp, Lid, Rid, Assoc; these are called the sketch-axioms for category. 
Now, here is a proposition: 
A c-sketch is a category if and only if it satisfies each of the sketch-axioms for category. 
More precisely: the mapping C H C(s), F H F,,, is a full and faithful functor of the 
category Cat of small categories into the category of c-sketches; it is also l-l on objects, 
and the range of it consists exactly of those sketches that satisfy the s-axioms for category. 
This is practically clear. Indeed, a c-sketch S is (arises from) a category iff (1) to any 
object A E 1 S 1, there is an arrow lA: A + A assigned to A, (2) which is unique; (3) to 
any pair of arrow AA BA C as shown, there is assigned a composite gf: A + C, 
(4) which is unique; (5 and 6) composites with identities behave in the right way; and 
(7) composition is associative. Now, here each of the conditions (i) for i = 1 to 7 is 
equivalent o saying that S \ ri, with ri for i = 1 to 7 being the maps listed above in this 
order. 
The contents of the last sentence are, of course, completely elementary; still, 
together with the examples to be shown later, it contains the main point of the paper: 
the fact that there is a natural way of expressing the individual parts of specifications 
of various notions (that of “category” in this case) in the form of sketch-axioms. 
A sketch-axiom R + R’ may be read as an entailment that says: “the situation 
described in R entails that described in R”‘. For instance, ExComp “says” that the 
situation consisting of two composable arrows entails that which extends the first one 
by having (at least one) composite; UnComp “says” that the situation of having two 
arrows which are composites of the same pair of arrows entails the one in which those 
two arrows are equal. The entailment R -+ R’ being satisfied by S, Sk (R + R’), means 
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that no matter how we have a situation of the type R in S, we have another one in S of 
type R’ extending the first one. 
For a category ,!Y of sketches, and a sketch-entailment Y,“Y l= r” stands for “for all 
S E 9, S!=r”. With a set 9 of sketch-entailments (arrows), Sk9 means Skr for all 
r E 99’; Y F 9 means that S b g for all S E Y; and finally, l=,r means that for all S such 
that Sk&Y, we have Sl= r. These notations follow usual practice in logic. 
Given a category S and a set &! of arrows in it, by S:W we denote the full 
subcategory of S consisting of S E S for which S b W. S: 3 is called the category (or 
doctrine) specified by S and %‘. Above, up to isomorphism we exhibited Cat, the 
category of small categories, as S: P2 for S = cSk and %? = %&. Our contention is that 
many categories of structured categories can be naturally and profitably exhibited in 
the form S:2. For brevity, a doctrine speci$cation is a pair (SW), with S a sketch- 
category, with &? a set of arrows in S; it specijies S:.!%. 
A doctrine specification (S, 22) isJfinitary if S is a finitary sketch-category (see Section l), 
and W is a set of arrows between fp objects of S. The same is ajinite doctrine specification 
if S is a finite sketch-category, and 3, in addition to the previous requirement, is also 
a finite set. In this paper, we will restrict ourselves to finitary doctrine specification, 
although “infinitary” ones are equally relevant, in relation to doctrines of infinitary logic. 
In fact, with a single exception, all our examples will be finite doctrine specifications. 
Note that the general construction S: B is far from being new; S: 2 is the category of 
objects that are injectiue relative to the class .% of arrows; see, e.g., Ch. 4 of [l]. Also, 
the construction has a very general scope that is well-known. For example, the 
categories that can be obtained in the form S:B?, with S a presheaf category Set’ and 
52 a small set of arrows, are, up to equivalence of categories, those accessible categories 
that have (small) products. These categories are called weakly locally presentable in 
[ 11; see 4.8 Theorem, p. 178 in lot. cit. for a multiple characterization of weakly locally 
presentable categories, including the ones in the previous sentence. Thus, it is not the 
mere possibility of presenting a category in the form S:% that matters; rather, what 
does is the actual presentation itself. 
Let us note that, for the purposes of specification, the construction GlK is not 
necessary, the construction G 11 K suffices. The most immediate thing to say is that the 
former is equivalent o a full subcategory of the latter singled out by sketch-axioms. 
With any K E 1 KI, consider the sketch-map Uni[K] : ((K)) + (K) in G II K as 
follows. (K) has ((K) 1 = K, and KC(K)] = (O}, with 0 = id,; all other K/[(K)] = 0; 
((K)) also has I ((K)) I equal K, but KC{(K))] equal to (0, l}, with 0 = i = id,-; 
the map Uni[K] is the identity on the level of K. Clearly, the sketches atisfying each 
Uni[K] (K E K) are exactly the ones in which maps s H S are each one-to-one; the 
latter form the essential image of the inclusion of GI K in G 11 K. (The existence in the 
satisfaction of the axiom Uni [K] is automatically a unique existence; this means that 
the objects of GI K are singled out in G /I K by the condition of being orthogonal (see 
[9]) to given arrows between fp objects; this also shows that Gl K is lfp if G//K is.). 
Accordingly, we can restate our specifications, in the one example above, and the 
many examples later, to take place always in the context of a sketch-category of the 
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form G (1 K. The cSk, (as opposed to cSk) is Graph I/ {I, CT}. Then, we have to redefine 
the sketch-axioms for category, in the obvious way, by replacing each by its image 
under the inclusion functor GI K + G//K. Finally, we add the sketch-axioms 
Uni[I], Uni[CT]. The resulting specification gives Cat up to equivalence. 
The category (doctrine) S:W specified by ($9) is an accessible category having 
small products as remarked above. In general, we cannot say much more; e.g., S:9 is 
not locally presentable in general; actually, most of our examples are not locally 
presentable (equivalently, they do not have all (small) limits). (Most of the examples 
become locally presentable as a bicategory, with an additional structure of 2-cells; this 
is the main subject of the sequel [26]; here, we will not have anything to do with the 
higher dimensional aspects of doctrines.) 
Assume that S is an lfp category, and .% is a set of arrows between fp objects of 
S (these are the assumptions on (S, 9) under which the general theory of this section, 
and Sections 3 and 8 go through; a finitary doctrine specification satisfies these 
assumptions). Consider the following cardinal invariant of (S, 9). Let J = A,,# be the 
maximum of the following three cardinals: No, the cardinality of ,9, and the cardina- 
lity of the set of the isomorphism classes of fp objects in S. When (S,9?) is a finite 
doctrine specification, 1 is equal to No; now, the fp objects are the finite objects; any 
horn-set of two finite objects is finite. 
For any regular cardinal K > i (hence, in the finite case, any uncountable regular 
cardinal), an object S E S is K-presentable iff hom(R, S) is of cardinality < K for all 
R E S,,. This follows from 2.3.13 (p. 30) in [28]; notice (to make the connection with 
lot. cit.) that, by 2.3.4 (p. 22) lot. cit. N, 4 K. For example, in the finite case a sketch is 
k--presentable, for any infinite regular cardinal K, iff its cardinality (in the usual sense of 
the cardinality of a functor C + Set) is < K; this is true for K = No since in a finite 
topos, the finitely presentable objects are exactly the finite objects; and for K > K. by 
what we just said. We have 
Let K be a regular cardinal, IC > &. Then S: 2 is K-accessible, and an object of S: .%? 
is K-presentable in S:9 iflit is K-presentable in S. Moreover, S:.% has jiltered colimits 
and arbitrary products, both preserved by the inclusion into S. 
Thus, for a finite doctrine specification (S,g), S:B is Hi-accessible, and K-acces- 
sible for all uncountable regular cardinals K. 
I will show the last-stated proposition only for a finitary (S,%‘). In this case, I will 
show that one can write down a set of axioms in “regular logic”, in a language for first 
order logic, whose category of models is isomorphic to S: 9’; both the language and the 
set of axioms are of cardinality I &,ip, and they are finite in the case of a finite doctrine 
specification. (An axiom in regular logic is a sentence of the form VY(cp(Z’) -+ $(X)), with 
cp and rl/ positive primitive formulas, of the form 3TAi<n0i(?,y), with the Bi atomic.) 
The above conclusions on accessibility and filtered colimits will then follow by 
3.3.5(ii) in [28, p. 561. (In fact, lot. cit. gives the desired conclusion on rc-accessibility 
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only when K is a successor cardinal. However, in the remaining case when K is weakly 
inaccessible, K > ,&, one directly checks, using that S:9 is rc’-accessible for all 
successors rc’ such that &B < K’ < K, that the objects that are Ic’-presentable for some 
K’ < K form a dense subcategory of S: W via K-filtered colimits). The proof of 3.3.5(ii) in 
[28] gives that the objects of S: 92 that are K-presentable in S are dense in S:W, from 
which the conclusion on presentability follows. The assertion about products is best 
verified directly from the definitions. 
Let S = Set”, C a small category. Let L be the multi-sorted language which is 
the underlying graph of C its sorts are the objects of C, its unary sorted operation 
symbols the arrows of C. The axioms include the statements of the form 
V’x(g(f(x) = (gof)(x)), for every composable pair (f, g) of arrows of C, and the ones of 
the form Vx(l,-(x) = x) for each C E Oh(C). Each of the rest of the axioms a, is 
associated with a sketch-axiom r:R + R’ in B. as follows: 
v (X(C,a) >CE C,a E R(C) 
i 
A fh,,ad) = %az,) -+ 
f:C, -c2 
(Rf)(a,)=az 
3(Y(C,b,)C.C,b.R’CC, 
i 
A .f( X(C,,b,)) = XV&b,) 
f:C, +c, 
b,sRC,, bzcRC2 
(Rf)(bl)=bz 
A A +~,a) = Y(C,b) . 
CEC 
aeRC, bsR’C 
rc(a)=b 
The class of objects of S: 9? is precisely the class of L-models satisfying the axioms; the 
arrows of S:_!% are the L-homomorphisms. 
3. Formal deductions of sketch-entailments 
For motivation, we first consider the simple example of a possible way the category 
(S) presented by a c-sketch S may be constructed. (S) comes with a canonical 
“embedding” y:S -+ (S); note that we are identifying the category (S) with the 
corresponding sketch as in the previous section. y is defined by the familiar universal 
property: y:S + (S) factors uniquely through any S -+ D, with D a (sketch derived 
from a) category. The construction of (S) can be performed in steps, providing 
successive xtensions of sketches. In one step, e.g., the composite of two arrows, 
f: A + B, g: B + C, with matching codomain and domain, has to be added to T, the 
sketch of the previous step. This can be accomplished by taking the pushout 
T, T’ 
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where r is “composition”, the map ExComp of 1.1 and where cp : R + T picks out the 
two arrows (0,l) Hf, (1,2) H g: 
* 
. 
. ..yBKc.. . . . AyB\C.. . 
h 
This is a superfluous move if there already is in T a commutative triangle withfand 
g as two of the sides. But, applying another pushout 
%I q /t; 
T’ - T” 
this time with r1 being UnComp in 1.1, and q1 picking out the two commutative 
triangles concerned, T” has the two composites identified; nothing else happened to T ‘I: 
o/f\, . 
I 
.,r”y; - 
I 
With Y : R + R’ any map of c-sketches, and q : R -+ T an arbitrary map, we write cp*r 
for the pushout (1). 
We apply the operations cp*r iteratively; r ranges over the seven s-axioms for 
category in 1.1. We are tempted to call those seven sketch-maps the templates of the 
construction. The process goes through a possibly transfinite number of steps. Having 
made a limit-number of steps, we take the colimit of the chain of sketches of the 
previous steps as the construction of the next step. We will arrive at the desired 
category after a suitable number of steps without any particular care for what 
templates we use in what order provided we take care of unwanted “infinite loops”. 
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Note that we may get into the rut of adding more and more composites offand g in 
the above example, not getting the opportunity for anything else, if we do not take the 
care to avoid doing so. Here is a general recipe: 
apply the operation cp*r only if 50 dose not factor through r. 
Certainly, this is reasonable since if cp does factor through r, the job that we want to do 
with the operation cp*r is already done; e.g., if r is the “uniqueness” map UnComp, the 
operation ‘p*r will identify two arrows that are already equal. I claim that 
Any transjinite sequence of completion steps as described above that avoids superju- 
ous steps as specijed will terminate in (S) in an ordinal number of steps whose 
cardinality is less than or equal to max(K,, #(S)). 
I will not take the time to prove the claim; the essence of the argument will be 
contained in the proof of Corollary 6 below. It suffices to say that theJinite segments of 
the construction of (S) will act as the formal deductions for the doctrine specified by 
cSk and &Tcat. 
Let S be a category having pushouts, 92 a set of arrows in it. We will talk about objects 
of S as “sketches”, because of the applications. In what follows, S and 92 are fixed. 
An entailment (an arrow in S) u: U + U’ is immediately deducible (from B) if it is 
a pushout of some r E 9: there is a pushout diagram of the form 
in S, with r some element of W. Further, t : S + T is directly deducible (from 92) if it is 
the composite of finitely many immediately deducible ones. Finally, s:S + s’ is 
deducible (from %), in notation t-s, or more specifically k* s, if an extension of s is 
directly deducible: there is a t’:S’ + T such that t’os:S + T is directly deducible. 
For the notion of formal deduction, there are a couple of slightly different candi- 
dates. In the most explicit version, a (formal) deduction of s: S + S’ (from 9) consists 
of a map t’: S’ + T together with a finite sequence of pushout squares (1’) with each 
r from 92 such that the u-legs of the squares are composable, and they give t’os as their 
composite. In a less explicit, but more economical, version, a deduction ofs is given by 
a sequence (Ui)i 2 n of objects and a sequence (Ui: Ui + Ui+ I)i+ 1 s n of arrows such 
that each Ui is immediately deducible, and such that there is a map t’: S’ -+ T satisfying 
t’“S = u,-, oun-20 ... oug. 
We discuss effectiveness notions (decidable, effectively enumerable (e.e.), .. . ) for the 
use with sketch-based syntax. We take as the basic space of finite entities the set HIF of 
hereditarily finite (hf) sets; WF = V,, the oth level in the von Neumann hierarchy of 
pure sets. We have the standard notions of decidable (= recursive), e.e. (= recursively 
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enumerable), etc. for subsets of HE; they coincide with the sets that are Al-definable, 
resp. ,X,-definable in (W[F, E 1 HT). The good thing about W[F is that it is closed under 
the operations of taking ordered pairs, finite sets, and finite sequences of elements; any 
morphism f: A + B between hf sets A, B is an hf set (f = (A, B, graph(f)), etc. 
In our determination of specific entities (specification types and sketch axioms), we 
take care of making them hf sets. Notice that the specification types for cSk, and the 
axioms in ,gcat are hf sets; similar control will be exercised in the later examples too. 
The general theory of sketches, as any reasonable categorical theory, has all its 
concepts invariant under isomorphism. For example, the notions of “finite”, “exact- 
ness property” (a notion introduced later), “deducible from given set of axioms”, etc. 
are all invariant under isomorphism in suitable senses. This invariance helps us give 
a precise meaning to effectiveness notions. In general, we say that a collection ‘% of 
finite entities (sketches, sketch-entailments, sequences of sketch-entailments (deduc- 
tions), . . ) is decidable, or e.e., if the subcollection V,,r of its hf elements is decidable, 
resp. e.e. Since PZ is (usually) closed under isomorphism, the subcollection Y?,, is 
representative: very entity in % has an isomorphic copy in %,,r. 
For example, if the finite category ?Z is in fact an hf set (and clearly, every finite 
category is isomorphic to one which is an hf set), then every finite object of Set’ is 
isomorphic to an (in fact, several) hf object (a functor %? + Set that takes hf values; 
such a functor can clearly be identified with an appropriate hf set). Thus, every finite 
sketch, and every finite sketch-entailment, in Set(‘ is isomorphic to one which is hf. 
I have made explicit certain aspects of effectiveness in the algebraic context. When 
people talk, e.g., about an r.e. set of finite groups, they have in mind (or should have in 
mind) a concept like the one described above. One difference might be that people 
would tend to talk about Godel numbering by natural numbers “in the usual way”; 
using hf sets removes this kind of vagueness. 
Suppose that S is a finite sketch-category, with all specification types being hf sets. 
Then the predicate Ded(d, s, ,/A) with the variables d, s and .@ ranging over MXF, 
“4 is a (finite) set of sketch-entailments in S, s is a sketch-entailment in S, and d is 
a deduction of s from $2”. 
in either sense of “deduction”, is decidable. This is seen by inspection, given our 
experience with similar statements in many contexts (among others, in “effective 
algebra”). 
It immediately follows that the set of syntactical consequences $2[9?] = {s: k#ps} of
a finite set W of sketch-entailments is r.e. In fact, since 
“s[.X] = u &[%‘], 
X’ C x 
59’ finite 
the same conclusion follows for any r.e. set 9 of axioms. 
Similar assertions can be made in the more general case of finitary doctrine 
specifications, provided they are “countably and effectively” given. 
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The notion of formal deduction is a codification of that of diagram manipulation. In 
a sketch-category, a deduction (with a finite premise) involves a succession of finite 
sketches, that is, finite diagrams with certain distinguished parts designated to have 
special qualities (product, exponential, etc.). Each sketch in the succession is obtained 
by an application of a rule, that is, an arrow in 9, where an application of the rule 
r: R -+ R’ to a sketch U consists in selecting an R-figure cp: R -+ U in U, and amalga- 
mating R’ with U with respect to the maps r and cp via a pushout. The last 
amalgamation, a pushout effects only a local change in U, because of the nature of 
pushouts in a finite topos, deriving as they do from pushouts in Set. These local 
changes consist in adding a bounded number of new entities (objects, arrows, designa- 
tions of parts as “product”, etc.), and/or identifying a certain bounded number of 
entities (here “bounded” means “bounded by an integer depending only on 9, not on S”). 
For an entailment (arrow in S) s, let us say that s is valid if bzs, and deducible if kBs; 
let V = V”[W] be the class of valid entailments, 9 = z%[B] that of the deducible 
ones. 
Lemma 1. For either of the classes X = V, X = 9, the following properties hold: 
(i) Every isomorphism belongs to X. 
(ii) The composite of two composable elements of X belongs to X. 
(iii) ZfgofeX, thenf EX. 
(iv) Any pushout of a member of X is again a member of X: ifin the pushout (1’) r E X, 
then u E X. 
The easy proof is left to the reader. 
The class 9 is clearly contained in the least class X closed under (i), (iii) and (iv); by 
the lemma, applied to X = $9, it is the same as that least class, as well as the least class 
satisfying all four of conditions in the lemma. The lemma, applied to X = V now, thus 
gives 
Corollary 2 (Soundness Theorem). Each deducible arrow is valid; 9 c V. 
In what follows, we assume that S is a locally finitely presentable (lfp) category. 
Next, we recall some elementary facts concerning comma-categories. Let S E S. The 
comma-category SJS (with objects arrows S + T, and arrows (S + T) --) (S + U) the 
arrows T -P U, making the triangle commute; see [23]) is also lfp, and the forgetful 
functor S&S + S creates (small) colimits. 
An fp object of SJS is called a relatively finite (rf) arrow in S. The rf arrows are 
pushouts of fp arrows of S if S + T is rf, there exists a pushout diagram 
R - R’ 
S-T 
with R, R’ fp objects. 
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Connecting two comma-categories, we note that the composite of two (composable) 
rf arrows in S is rf again. 
Theorem 3 (General Completeness Theorem). Let S he an Efp category, and W a set of 
arrows between fp objects in S. For any relativelyfinite entailment s: S -+ S’, t-#.s o k.#s; 
that is, for such s, validity and deducibility coincide. 
For the proof, we need some preliminaries. Throughout this section, S and 9 are as 
in the statement of Theorem 3. 
Recall the cardinal i, = 3,,,# from Section 2. Let S E S. We denotes by its the least 
uncountable regular cardinal K such that S is K-presentable and 1 < K. When S 
is a finite sketch-category, ICY = K1 for S (finite or) countable, and ICY = (#(S))+ 
otherwise. 
A transfinite sequence 
of sketches, with a system of connecting maps, is called an infinitary deduction (co- 
deduction) if it is compatible (uYs 0 upu = ups (p I y I 6 5 CI), uBp = lu, (/I I c(), continu- 
ous (for each limit ordinal fl I c(, U, is the colimit of the restricted system with indices 
< fi, with colimit coprojections the uYB for y I /I), and each u~,~+ 1 (/I + 1 I M) is an 
immediately deducible arrow; it is of length a; it is based on the sketch S if UO = S. 
Appropriately, a deduction is an co-deduction of finite length. 
cc-deduction can be composed. If 4% is as above, and 
is another co-deduction such that V, = U,, then -Y‘o%! is the m-deduction 
onlengtha+~forwhichWg=U~(PIcl),W,+,=I/,(vI~),wS,=ull,(BIyIcx), 
“&z+Y = voV3up, (/3 I cx,v I 4 and w,+~,~+” = vPV (11 IV I 1). 
Let us call an immediately deducible arrow u: U + U’ proper if it results from some 
pushout (1’) with r E 2, in which cp does not factor through r. In particular, this 
implies that u is not an isomorphism; but in general, the latter condition is weaker 
than u being a proper immediately deducible arrow. 
The co-deduction (2) is proper if each u lI,B + 1 (/I + 1 I a) is a proper immediately 
deducible arrow. 
Proposition 4. For any sketch S, all proper co-deductions based on S are of length c I+. 
Proof. Suppose that, contrary to the assertion, there is a proper cc-deduction 
((U,>,..,(U,,,:UB-‘U*)~~~<-~)~~~~U~=S, K = K~. For every ordinal !x < K, there 
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is Y, E 9 such that u,,,+ 1 is a pushout of r,: 
RX 
6 
* R:. 
‘Pr 
I I 
cPh 
0 
v, 
&,,+I 
*u cc+1 
and such that 
(3) (pb does not factor through rI. 
Furthermore, if c( is a limit ordinal, 
(4) U, = colim((u,,p: U, + UP), <B<n) with coprojections (I+~)~<~. 
By induction on CY < K, we see that U, is K-presentable; the reason is that a colimit of 
a diagram of size < IC of rc-presentable objects is x-presentable. Since also R < K, it 
follows by remarks in Section 2 that for all fp R and CI < K, 
(5) hom(R, U,) has cardinality < rc. 
Let c( < K be any limit ordinal. Since R, is fp, by (4) there is Pa < c1 such that (Pi 
factors through ugEa: we have 
“/q 
a 
cpz (6) 
Since K is regular and uncountable, by the regressive function theorem (Fodor’s 
lemma, [15]), there is fi < K and an unbounded(-below-rc) set A of limit ordinals < K 
such that for all CI E A, /Ia = /3. Since #%Y I 3, < K, and K is regular, there are 
(RAR’) E 9 and an unbound subset A’ of A such that for all c( E A’, Y, = r, in 
particular, R, = R. By (5) hom(R, U,) has cardinality < K. Therefore, there are 
$: R + U, and an unbounded subset A” of A’ such that for all M E A”, $a = t,b. Let 
al < CQ be two distinct elements of A”. Applying (5) to CI = c(r and a2, we get that in 
the right-hand triangle commutes. Consider 
(6’) 
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in which ‘pfttz u,, + l,rr, 3 cp&. We obtain that 
$31. = U,,+l,aZOU*,,,,+l’(PI, = %l,*20(Pa, = CPLQ 
(the last equality by (6’)), that is, (P=* factors through Y = ra2, contrary to (3) (proper- 
ness). This contradiction completes the proof. 0 
The co-deduction (2) is an extension of another one, say %‘, if, for some a’ I x, 
d+Y = % r~‘~ef ((LJs)P5a,,(~bY:UP --) UY)B4 ysa,): % is a ro er x ension of O&’ if, in p p e t 
addition, CI’ < CI. A proper co-deduction is maximal if it does not have any proper 
extension which is a proper co-deduction. Note that all these concepts are relative to 
a given set 9 of sketch-axioms. 
It is immediately seen that UilG as in (2) is maximal if and only if r%lttz U, satisfies 
every r E 9, i.e., if and only if rJP E S: W. 
Corollary 5. Any proper a-deduction can be extended to a maximal one. 
Proof. Consider the class C of proper oo-deductions based on a fixed sketch S. Each 
% E C has a length < K = rcs, and as noted in the previous proof, every object in % is 
K-presentable. Let B be a small set of k-presentable objects such that every K- 
presentable object is isomorphic to one in B. Let C’ be the set of % E C such that all 
the objects of % come from B. Clearly, C’ is small. A chain X in C’ is a subset of C’ such 
that for any two elements of X, one is an extension of the other. The union of any 
chain in C’ is clearly again an element of C’. By Zorn’s lemma, for any % E C’, there is 
~2’ E C’ extending & which is maximal in C’. Clearly, if % E C’ is not maximal, then it 
is not maximal in C’ either, that is, it has a proper extension in C’. Hence, any Q E C’ 
has 4?’ E C’ extending 6. such that %’ is maximal in C’, that is, maximal. 0 
We call any sketch of the form r%l, with % a maximal proper co-deduction based 
on S, a doctrinal hull of S; the corresponding canonical map qr : S + r4V is uosl when 
Uu is as in (2). Each doctrinal hull belongs to the doctrine S:W. 
Corollary 6. Any sketch has at least one doctrinal hull. 
An a- deduction 4Y as in (2) based on S gives rise to the a-directly deducible arrow 
~~:S+r4P=U,,(pp=uO~.Anarrows:S -+ T is E-deducible if an extension of it is 
co-directly deducible: for some t : T -+ T ‘, t 0 s is -directly deducible. Note that to say 
that s: S -+ T is co-deducible is the same as to say that there exists a doctrinal hull r%l 
of S such that r%1 Fs. 
The length of an co-directly deducible arrow s is the least ordinal CI for which there 
is an co-deduction u1% of length SI with ‘pJu = s. 
Lemma 7. The length of an z-directly deducible arrow is either jinite, or a limit 
ordinal. 
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Proof. First, we show that if 42 = ((Up)85a+l,(~gy:U,r -+ Ur)p5r5a+l) is an oo- 
deduction of length CI + 1, with 01 a limit ordinal, then there is an co-deduction %!* of 
length a such that ‘pq = cpz. A consequence will be that the length of an co-directly 
deducible arrow cannot be of the form CI + 1, with c1 a limit ordinal. 
Let % be as stated. By assumption, there is a pushout square 
with r E 9. Since R is fp, and CI is a limit ordinal, there are fl < a and tie: R + Up such 
that Ic/, = uBa~ IC/a. Let, for y with p I y < c(, $, = uBr~ tip (this is compatible with the 
previous notation for y = p and y = a). Consider, for p 5 y I LX, the pushout 
for y = a, define (8) to be the already available (7). For j3 I y i 6 < a, we have 
namely, the universal property of (8) gives utd to make the middle square (and the 
right-hand square) commute, and then it follows that the middle square (and the 
right-hand square) are pushouts, by the principle 
tY.lTl - t-jat 
-__--__--. 
0 
I claim that 42’ = (( Uc)s s y <a, (z&: U; + Ui)s s y c a I ,J is an co-deduction. It is 
clear that 42’ is compatible. The fact that it is continuous follows from the fact that 
pushouts commute with filtered colimits. Finally, each t&+ 1 (/I I y < y + 1 I a) is 
immediately deducible, since it is (by (9)) a pushout of the immediately deducible 
arrow r++ r. 
Consider the composite co-deduction %2* = %!‘o (1+)042 1 fl; notice that 
uP: UP -+ Uk gives a one-element deduction by (8) (for y = p). (P%* = z& 0 ug 0 uOa = 
u,,,+ 1 ou~,“uop = (P4, and the length of @!* is j?+l+(a-p)=p+ 
(1 + (a - /?)) = /? + (a - b) = a. We have shown our assertion. 
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Let a be the length of some co-directly deducible arrow. We show by induction on 
CI that CI is either finite, or a limit ordinal. If c( = 0 or a is limit, there is nothing to show. 
Assume x = fi + 1; let Q be an co-deduction of length /I + 1. If there were an co- 
deduction 9” of length < /I such that qo, = gala, then Y#- = (up.0 + r ) 0 V would be an 
co-deduction of length < p + 1 for which (Pi = cpv, contradicting the minima- 
lity of a. We obtained that p is the length of qrlP. By induction hypothesis, therefore 
p is either finite or limit. In the first case, a = /3 + 1 is finite. In the second case, /I + 1 is 
a length, and /I is limit, in contradiction to our first-proved assertion. 0 
Lemma 8. Any relatively Jinite co-deducible entailment is deducible. 
Proof. Suppose s: S + T is an rf entailment. By induction on the ordinal a, we show 
that if an co-directly deducible arrow of length a and with domain S factors through s, 
then s is (finitely) deducible. By Lemma 7, c( is either finite, or a limit ordinal. If c( is 
finite, there is nothing to prove. If o! is limit, Jk is an co-deduction as in (2), U, = S, and 
then, since, in SJS, the object (uOa :S + U,) is the (filtered) colimit of the objects 
(uoB: S + UP) (p < LX), with connecting arrows the ZQ, and s as an object in SJS is fp, 
there is p < y such that the arrow 
r:(s:S + T) --t(r4()a:S -+ U,) 
factors through 
UBa:(UOB:S~UP)~(Uoa:S-*Ua); 
there is z’:(S -+ T) + (uog:S -+ U,) with r = uga or’. We can ignore the last equality; 
even without that. we have that 
%! lfl is an cc-deduction of length I /I < a; by the induction hypothesis, sis deducible. 
cl 
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose the relatively finite entailment s: S -+ T is valid. Then, 
for some (any) (see Corollary 6) doctrinal hull r4P of S, r%l k s. Since %s is in 
particular an co-deduction, s is co-deducible. By Lemma 8, it is deducible. q 
For later reference, we summarize some properties of the doctrinal hull (see 
Corollary 6). 
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Proposition 9. Let r32T be a doctrinal hull of the sketch S, with q%:S + r%T the 
canonical map. Then: 
(i) for any regular IC > &, if S is u-presentable, so is r%7. 
(ii) (p* has thef 11 o owing mapping property: for any A E SIB’, any q: S --) A factors 
through rp,; that is, there is $:‘421 --) A such that cp = I)o(P~. 
Proof. r%l is the colimit of a maximal proper co-deduction (2), S = U,,, and (p4 
1s U&. . U, -+ U, = rql. Assume that S is K-presentable; K 2 ICY (see before Proposi- 
tion 4). In the proof of Theorem 3, we noted that each U, (p -C IX) is rc-presentable (K
lot. cit. is Q; but IC 2 Q). By Proposition 4, a < K; as a colimit of a diagram of size 
< IC of K-presentable objects, r%l is K-presentable. This shows (i). 
To show (ii), for a given q:S -+ A, by recursion on y < a, we construct tiy: U,, -+ A 
such that $ = tiO, and $, 0 upr = $p whenever /3 < y < a. When y is a limit ordinal, II/, 
is uniquely given from the 1,9~, p < y, by the universal property of U, as the colimit of 
the U,, fl< y. When y = /3 +l, there is a pushout 
R r *R’ 
OI .I 
u-u P 5% J 
with x E 9. Since AFr, there is z: R’ -+ A with tiD 0 8 = zor. By the universal property 
of the pushout U,, there is $?: U, + A with (among others) &OZQ~ = tip. It follows that 
$7 OU~,~ = eD, for all p’ < y. 
For y = a, I,& is the desired $. 0 
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